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ABSTRACT 
 
Congress has recently enacted measures designed to improve corporate governance standards.  
Regulators have asserted that strong corporate governance enhances the transparency and 
validity of financial statements.  Previous studies addressing the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial reporting quality yield mixed results.  This study employs analyst 
earnings forecasts to determine whether corporate governance procedures impact the quality of 
accounting information.  Following the work of Barron et al. (1998), we examined the impact of 
various measures of the strength of corporate governance on forecast accuracy and dispersion.  
Our results provide mixed evidence to support the notion that the strength of corporate 
governance impacts the quality of financial statement information.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he headlines reporting corporate abuse and fraud seem to be a daily event in recent years.  John and 
Tim Rigas, executives at Adelphia Communications, received prison sentences of 15 and 20 years 
for looting the cable company.  Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski and CFO Mark Swartz were convicted 
of grand larceny for taking hundreds of millions of dollars from shareholders. Bernie Ebbers, CEO of WorldCom, 
allowed an $11 billion accounting fraud to occur that resulted in the loss of $180 billion of shareholder value as 
stock prices plummeted.  And, perhaps, the most notable case, Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, former CEOs of 
Enron, were both convicted of fraud and conspiracy that eventually led to the bankruptcy of Enron, once the 7
th
 
largest company on the S&P 500.  According to Nell Minow from The Corporate Library, “these companies came to 
symbolize a breakdown in corporate governance that rocked stock prices and investor confidence” (Loomis 2004).  
 
These and other scandals prompted a wave of regulations to promote corporate responsibility.  Specifically, 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002.  One of the primary objectives of this initiative was to 
enhance the validity of information reported to shareholders by requiring corporate boards to be more responsible 
for the behavior of their CEO.  Regulators hope that implementation of these policies will result in improved 
financial disclosures, reduced fraudulent activity, and stronger financial markets.   
 
Compliance with these standards, however, is expensive.  According to a survey by RHR International, 
companies with more than $4 billion in revenues spend an average of $35 million to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley 
(Henry and Borrus 2005).  HI/fn, a computer security company with $40 million in revenue, reported that in-house 
documentation of SOX 404 resulted in an expense of $200,000 (Cheney 2004).  According to William R. Walker, 
chief financial officer and secretary of Hi/fn, “[SOX Section 404] is a very expensive operation for small companies.  
It‟s hard intellectually to argue against good internal controls, but the costs, with minimal value, are significant” 
(Cheney 2004).  Walker‟s sentiment is not uncommon.  The cost of compliance with SOX has caused many small 
firms to „go dark‟ – de-register with the SEC and de-list from major exchanges (Marosi and Massoud 2004). Thus, it 
is important to evaluate if enhanced corporate governance actually generates the desired outcome.  This study, 
therefore, examines if strong corporate governance improves the financial reporting environment of markets. 
 
 
T 
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Research that evaluates the impact of corporate governance policies on the financial reporting environment 
generates mixed evidence.  Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) demonstrated that corporations with more efficient 
boards and stronger audit committees led to the issuance of more forecasts by management that were also more 
accurate. Contrary to these results, research by Koehn and Ueng (2005) documented that firms with poor 
governance practices provided financial information that was at least as good as firms with strong corporate 
governance.  In addition, Farber (2005) found that firms previously cited for fraud had difficulty overcoming the 
stigma, even after improving their corporate governance practices.  Specifically, they still faced issues with 
credibility as institutional holdings and the number of analysts following the company did not increase subsequent to 
governance improvements.  Thus, it is not clear whether stronger corporate governance directives accomplish the 
desired goal of creating more transparent and reliable financial statements.  
 
Holthausen and Watts (2001) strongly advocated the use of research methods that do not rely on capital 
market data to assess the relative quality of financial disclosures, especially when research using capital markets 
data yields inconclusive results.  Recent research (e.g., Barron et al. 2002) examined analyst‟s reliance on financial 
statements to measure the quality of financial disclosures.  Analysts are market intermediaries that aggregate both 
financial and non-financial information to derive estimates of earnings.  Behavior of analysts provides insight into 
the activities and beliefs of investors that cannot be directly observed (Nichols 1989).  Thus, we utilize analysts‟ 
earnings forecasts to provide an alternative framework for examining the impact of corporate governance on 
financial markets.    
 
Using data from The Corporate Library, an investment research firm that grades the corporate governance 
structures of U.S. companies, we empirically examined the impact of strong corporate governance on financial 
reporting by assessing the analysts‟ information environment.  Higher quality information, an assumed product of 
strong corporate governance, should reduce analysts‟ need to obtain external, idiosyncratic information.  
 
Our results provide mixed evidence on the relationship between corporate governance and the quality of 
financial disclosures.  Specifically, governance scores from The Corporate Library tend not to be related to analysts‟ 
consensus or the accuracy of individual forecasts.  In fact, the only governance attribute that appears to impact 
uncertainty is the number of “best practices” followed by our sample companies.  These results are consistent with 
those reported by Koehn and Ueng (2005) and Farber (2005) that suggested that strong corporate governance 
policies may not result in improvements in the financial reporting environment.   
 
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Analytical studies of analysts‟ behavior provide mathematical models that illustrate the relationship 
between information quality and the characteristics of earnings forecasts (see Diamond 1985, Kim and Verrecchia 
1997).  These models show that analysts use two types of information to produce earnings estimates: information 
that is available to all analysts (i.e., common information) and information that is privately obtained or generated 
and, therefore, is not available to all analysts (i.e., idiosyncratic information).  Publicly released financial statements 
are an example of common information.  An example of idiosyncratic information is that obtained directly from 
interviews with a company‟s management.    
 
Analysts are motivated to efficiently use all sources of information (both common and idiosyncratic) to 
produce the most accurate earnings forecasts.  In settings where common disclosures are of inferior quality, analysts 
will tend to make less accurate forecasts (Barron et al. 1998).  The quality of common information has also been 
shown to affect analysts‟ reliance on idiosyncratic (private) information.  Specifically, analysts place more emphasis 
on idiosyncratic information when common information is of low quality (Barron et al. 2002).  Thus, an increase in 
analysts‟ use of idiosyncratic information results in greater dispersion of earnings forecasts (Barron et al. 1998).  
 
We assume that stronger corporate governance results in higher quality financial information.  Analysts 
will make more accurate forecasts for firms with strong corporate governance.  Under this assumption, analysts are 
expected to place greater priority on obtaining private information for firms with weak corporate governance 
because the financial statements (i.e., common information) are low quality.  Because analysts are expected to use 
more idiosyncratic information when firms have poor governance structures, analysts‟ forecasts for these firms are 
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likely to have increased uncertainty and greater dispersion (less consensus).  Thus, we evaluate the effect of 
corporate governance on the financial reporting environment by measuring the impact of corporate governance 
ratings on analysts‟ consensus and uncertainty.  We test two hypotheses: (1) weak corporate governance will result 
in lower consensus among analysts and (2) aggregate analysts‟ forecasts will be more accurate than individual 
forecasts by a larger margin when corporate governance is weak.  
 
Dependent variables 
 
Our measures for consensus and uncertainty are derived from Barron et al. (1998) and Barron et al. (2002).  
They demonstrated that consensus and uncertainty can be measured in terms of three forecast properties: expected 
dispersion, expected squared error in the mean forecast, and the number of analysts issuing forecasts, N. Relying on 
this methodology we utilized the dependent variables established by Barron et al. (2002): 
 
U – SE : a measure of the benefits of aggregating individual analysts‟ forecasts (uncertainty), and  
 
  : a measure based on observed values of forecast dispersion and the squared error in the mean forecast 
(consensus).   
where: 
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and: 

itD is the observed dispersion among the forecasts for firm i in  
year t; 

itSE is the observed squared error in the mean forecast for firm i  
in year t; 
itN is the observed number of forecasts we use for firm i in year t; 
jitF is the forecast from analyst j for firm i in year t; 
itF  is the mean of the forecasts for firm i in year t; and  
itA is the actual earnings for firm i in year t. 
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Independent variables 
 
We are interested in measuring the impact of corporate governance on the information environment of 
analysts.  We utilized corporate governance ratings from the The Corporate Library as our primary independent 
variable.  The Corporate Library developed a proprietary ratings formula to identify potential problems with board 
effectiveness.  Their ratings formula is a compilation of seven categories that are indicative of board effectiveness:  
board composition, CEO compensation, shareholder responsiveness, accounting, strategic decision making, 
litigation and regulatory problems, and takeover defenses.  Relying on key evaluators, their approach identified 
potential problems at Enron, Worldcom, Global Crossing, and others before their collapse.  Our primary variable of 
interest is the overall governance score received by the rated companies.  We also evaluated the seven component 
scores as a supplemental test.  Finally, as an alternative to the The Corporate Library grade, we assessed if the “Best 
Practice Compliance Score” for each company is related to uncertainty and consensus in the information 
environment.    
 
Control Variables 
 
We incorporated numerous control variables that have been shown to impact the information environment 
of analysts.  The first two control variables measure the time-series variability in earnings of the sample firms.  
SDEPSj,t is the standard deviation of annual earnings per share over the three years prior to the research period 
deflated by annual EPS in the year prior to the start of the research period.  CHNIj,t is the absolute value of the 
change in annual EPS between the year t-1 and year t-2 deflated by EPS at t-2.  Greater variability in earnings (as 
evidenced by higher SDEPSj,t and CHNI j,t) indicate that prior year‟s earnings are potentially less useful as a 
predictor of future earnings.  This may encourage market participants to increase their private information 
acquisition activities (Barron et al. 2002).  
 
The remaining control variables have been shown to impact accuracy and/or forecast dispersion in previous 
research.  NUMj,t is the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts.  Lang and Lundholm (1996) found that 
firms with high quality financial disclosure have a greater number of analysts following, more earnings forecast 
accuracy and less dispersion among analysts‟ forecasts.  MKTCAPj,t  is the market value of equity at time t-1.  Lang 
and Lundholm (1996) also demonstrated that larger firms have greater forecast accuracy.  In addition, Barron et al. 
(2002) used market to book, MKBK, to proxy for firm growth opportunities.  Growth firms have a greater analyst 
following, indicating greater investor demand for private information.  Finally, we included the percent of inside 
directors, %INSIDE, as a control variable because many view board independence as a necessary condition for 
strong corporate governance (Uzun et al. 2004).    
 
SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Our sample is comprised of firms that have data available from the Corporate Library, Compustat, and the 
Institutional Brokers Estimates Systems (I/B/E/S).  The Corporate Library contains evaluations of the governance 
structures of sample firms after evaluating the seven component ratings.  Firms with excellent corporate governance 
ratings receive a grade of A while those with poor governance structures receive a grade F.  In order to complete our 
evaluation, we transformed grades of A‟s into a governance score of 5, and those with F‟s into a governance score of 
1.  We calculated the market capitalization of sample firms as well as their market to book ratios using data from 
Compustat.  We obtained analysts forecast of EPS, actual EPS and the number of analysts following a firm from the 
I/B/E/S database.  Matching across the three data sources resulted in a final sample of 1,150 firms with complete 
observations.   
 
The descriptive statistics for the sample firms are provided in Table 1.  The sample firms exhibit a fair 
amount of time-series variability in earnings, with the average (median) value of CHNIj,t taking a value of 1.239 
(0.445).  In addition, their three year standard deviation in earnings is relatively high.  Firms tend to be large 
(average market capitalization of 2,407 million dollars) and have a relatively large high number of analysts 
following.    
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median SD 75% 25% 
m(U-SE)i -0.022 0.001 2.407 0.009 -0.001 
m(ρ)i 0.364 0.336 0.59 0.691 0.003 
NUM i 11.267 9.000 7.276 15 6 
SDEPSi 0.561 0.300 0.479 0.630 0.280 
CHNIi 1.239 0.445 2.581 1.072 0.184 
MKTCAPi 2,407 1,413 2,996 2,716 704 
MKBKi 3.156 2.571 1.979 3.901 1.302 
%INSi 0.122 0.055 0.174 0.137 0.024 
BESTi 84.846 86.000 8.631 91.000 80.000 
CGRATEi 3.534 3.556 0.381 4.105 3.308 
Variables are defined as follows: m(U-SE)I = mean of the U-SE variable defined in equations 1 and 4, m(ρ)I= mean of the ρ 
variable defined in equation 2, NUM i = number of analysts following the firm, SDEPSi= the standard deviation of EPS for the 
past 3 years, CHNIi= absolute value of change in earnings, MKTCAPi= market capitalization in millions of dollars, MKBKi= 
market value of firm deflated by to book value of equity, %INSi= % insiders on board of directors, BESTi = % of corporate 
governance best practices followed, provided by The Corporate Library, CGRATEi= average of individual corporate governance 
grades provided by The Corporate Library. 
 
 
The corporate governance characteristics reveal some interesting facts about our firms.  On average, the 
boards of directors of our sample companies are composed of 12.2% insiders.  In addition, the sample firms follow 
approximately 85% of the best practices defined by the Corporate Library database
1
.  Finally, the firms received an 
average aggregate corporate governance grade of 3.534, or an average grade of C.  Interestingly, according to the 
best practices checklist, the average grade would be a B. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Barron et al. 2002) ranked regression is used in our primary analysis.  
Table 2 provides results of a ranked regression of the relationship between corporate governance measures and 
information properties of analysts‟ forecasts.  The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is dispersion of analysts‟ 
forecasts.  The regression results indicate that dispersion in analysts‟ forecasts are positively related to the number of 
analysts following the company, NUM, and the variability in net income, CHNI.  Further, as the size of the 
corporation increases, the dispersion of analysts‟ forecasts decreases.  Contrary to our expectations, dispersion is not 
related to the two variables of interest: the percent of best practices an organization follows, BEST, or to their 
corporate governance rating, CGRATE.  These results suggest that the accuracy of analyst forecasts are not 
impacted by variation corporate governance structures.   
 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 provide the rank regression results for the relationship between corporate 
governance measures and analysts consensus.  Complimenting the results presented above, consensus is negatively 
correlated with the number of analysts following the company, NUM, and with the variability in net income, CHNI.  
The size of the company, MKTCAP, is not related to analysts‟ consensus.  In contrast to the previous regressions, 
we find some evidence of a relationship between forecast dispersion and the variables of interest.  Specifically, the 
percent of corporate governance best practices followed, BEST, is modestly related to analysts‟ consensus.  
However, the coefficient on CGRATE is not significant.  These results suggest that there is limited evidence of a 
relation between corporate governance quality and the characteristics of analyst forecasts. 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 The Corporate Library established a best practice compliance checklist that includes 21 yes or no items.  For example, are the 
CEO and Chairman of Board roles separated?  The list of items is similar to that developed by the Organization for Economic 
Collaboration and Development.   
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Table 2:  Rank Regression Analysis of Cross-Sectional Relationship Between Aggregate Corporate Governance Measures 
and Information Properties of Analysts’ Forecasts 
 Dependent Variables: 
Ind. Variables: m(U-SE)i  m(ρ)i  
INT. 471.69 
(105.9)* 
545.60 
(96.1)* 
861.42 
(7.72)* 
601.73 
(5.93)* 
NUM i 0.159 
(4.78)* 
0.157 
(4.73)* 
-0.069 
(-1.97)** 
-0.064 
(-1.83)* 
SDEPSi -0.046 
(-1.35) 
-0.046 
(-1.35) 
0.061 
(1.69)*** 
0.061 
(1.68)*** 
CHNIi 0.192 
(5.98)* 
0.193 
(6.00)* 
-0.061 
(-1.82)*** 
-0.065 
(-1.92)*** 
MKTCAPi -0.278 
(-8.17)* 
-0.277 
(-8.14)* 
-0.019 
(-0.53) 
-0.019 
(0.53) 
MKBKi -0.028 
(-0.92) 
-0.028 
(-0.92) 
0.023 
(0.73) 
0.020 
(0.64) 
%INSi 11.44 
(0.20) 
-6.075 
(-0.11) 
-67.08 
(-1.10) 
-16.44 
(-0.28) 
BESTi 1.313 
(1.13) 
 -2.767 
(-2.27)** 
 
CGRATE  11.24 
(0.44) 
 5.489 
(0.21) 
Adj R2 0.1054 0.1046 0.0075  
 t-statistics in parentheses.  *, **, *** reflect significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively  
 
 
Karmanou and Vafeas (2005) documented that management forecasts were more accurate when 
corporations had more efficient boards and stronger audit committees.  Vermeer (2005) found that companies 
making voluntary CEO/CFO certifications engaged in less income-increasing earnings management.  Hence, we 
also investigated if individual corporate governance mechanisms are related to dispersion and consensus in analysts‟ 
forecasts.   
 
Table 3 reports the results from regressing dispersion and consensus on The Corporate Library‟s seven 
component ratings.  Consistent with the results of Table 2, many of the control variable are significantly related to 
analyst forecasts accuracy and dispersion.  Moving to the analysis of the disaggregated corporate governance grades, 
we find little evidence of a relationship between corporate governance and forecast accuracy.  Specifically, no 
significant relationships are indentified between analyst forecast accuracy and corporate governance measures.  In 
the dispersion regressions, the only relationship that was marginally significant was between consensus and 
Litigation and Regulatory Problems, LITPROB.  Firms with fewer litigation and regulatory issues had greater 
consensus among analysts.  Overall, the results of this analysis provide extremely weak evidence of a relation 
between corporate governance and analyst forecast characteristics.   
 
Overall, the results reported in Tables 2 and Table 3 are somewhat consistent with those discussed by 
Koehn and Ueng (2005) and Farber (2005).  In both of those papers, stronger corporate governance directives did 
not appear to contribute to more transparent and reliable financial statements.  Our results indicate that stronger 
corporate governance ratings, as evaluated by The Corporate Library, do not seem to influence the information 
environment faced by analysts.    
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Changes in corporate regulations to reduce weaknesses in financial reporting are not new.  Nearly 100 years ago, the 
McKesson Robbins scandal led to Statements on Auditing Procedures that required auditors to observe inventories 
and confirm receivables (Arens and Elder 2006).  Several allegations of fraud occurred in the 1980‟s that resulted in 
standards requiring auditors to understand controls and to perform analytical procedures (Arens and Elder 2006).  
The requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley, in many ways, extend regulations that were a result of prior scandals in the 
accounting information environment.   
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Table 3:  Rank Regression Analysis of Cross-Sectional Relationship Between Disaggregated Corporate Governance 
Measures and Information Properties of Analysts’ Forecasts 
 Dependent Variables: 
Ind. Variables: m(U-SE)i m(ρ)i 
INT. 401.1 
(2.69)* 
736.54 
(4.41)* 
NUM i 0.158 
(4.73)* 
-0.066 
(-1.87)*** 
SDEPSi -0.047 
(-1.38) 
0.062 
(1.72)*** 
CHNIi 0.194 
(6.03)* 
-0.064 
(-1.87)*** 
MKTCAPi -0.276 
(-8.09)* 
-0.018 
(-0.49) 
MKBKi -0.028 
(-0.91) 
0.019 
(0.60) 
%INSi 22.38 
(0.37) 
-58.44 
(-0.92) 
BDEFF -6.03 
(-0.40) 
4.67 
(0.29) 
BDCOMP 11.88 
(0.98) 
-4.52 
(-0.35) 
CEOCOMP -2.44 
(-0.24) 
-1.80 
(-0.17) 
SHREP 18.62 
(0.76) 
-6.57 
(-0.25) 
LITPROB   2.72 
(0.15) 
32.11 
(1.69)*** 
TAKEOVER 11.47 
(1.16) 
-12.09 
(-1.16) 
ACC -8.24 
(-0.97) 
5.20 
(0.58) 
STRAT 19.44 
(0.70) 
-45.55 
(-1.54) 
Adj R2 0.1027 0.0022 
t-statistics in parentheses.*, **, *** reflect significance at the 0.01, 0.05,and 0.10, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.  
Additional variables are defined as follows: BDEFF = average board effectiveness grade, BDCOMP = board composition, 
CEOCOMP = CEO compensation, SHREP= shareholder responsiveness, LITPROB = litigation and regulatory Problems, 
TAKEOVER = takeover defenses, ACC= accounting quality, STRAT = strategic decision making. 
 
 
The benefits of increased regulation and corporate governance scrutiny are difficult to measure.  As Henry 
and Borrus (2005) point out, “the promised benefits of the reform movement are hard to spot and difficult to 
quantify:  frauds that never happened, or the boost to investor confidence that has helped bring life back to U.S. 
markets.”  Prior empirical research examining the benefits from strong corporate governance provide mixed results.  
The current paper evaluates the impact of corporate governance ratings, developed by The Corporate Library, on the 
information environment of analysts.  We postulate that stronger corporate governance will lead to improved 
financial reporting. Enhanced financial reporting should result in less dispersion and greater consensus in analysts‟ 
forecasts as they seek less idiosyncratic information.  The results provide only weak evidence of a relation between 
corporate governance and enhanced financial disclosure.    
 
Despite our results and those of Koehn and Ueng (2005) and Farber (2005), Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
increased emphasis on improving corporate governance are likely to remain.  Even though these new regulations 
may not alter the information environment of analysts, they are likely to result in better-managed companies that act 
as good corporate citizens.  According to Cheney, “some see the measures as not much more than cost without 
benefit” however, “companies are hoping that better governance and internal controls will improve public 
perception and attract investment (Cheney 2004). 
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